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NOTE
LOCKED UP, THEN LOCKED OUT: THE CASE FOR
LEGISLATIVE-RATHER THAN EXECUTIVEFELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM
ArnandaJ. Wong t

A cohesive anti-felon disenfranchisementperspective has
gained traction over the last two decades in America. Scholars have harshly criticized disenfranchisementprovisionsfor
their insulation and perpetuationof nonwhite marginalization
d la Jim Crow. Other critics have also decriedfelon disenfranchisementfor barringpriorfelons from full social integration. Still more critics point to how disenfranchisement
provisions inequitably affect election outcomes. State leaders,
recognizing the prevalent attitude against felon disenfranchisement, have taken signflcant measures to mitigate
disenfranchisementlaws-for example, some state governors
have issued executive orders categorically re-enfranchising
ex-felons. These types of actions are the focus on this Note.
Certainly, unilateralexecutive action is efficient and has been
effective in the short-term. However, this Note contends that
there are distinct political efficacy and consent theory concerns that emerge when broadfelon disenfranchisement reform comes from unilateral executive action. Moreover, this
Note argues, gubernatorialaction is by and large an inconsistent solution that ultimately fails to address the systemic civic
deprivationof nonwhite communities. This Note concludes by
proposingfederal legislative action-specifically, the Democracy Restoration Act-as a more favorable method of felon
disenfranchisementreform.
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INTRODUCTION

Forty-four-year-old Keith Sellars lives in Alamance County,
North Carolina, with his five children. He was born and raised
in Alamance County'-there is no other place in the world that
he would call home. 2 He is an established member of the community and has voted in the county many times before.3 Mr.
Sellars' fixed position in the Alamance County community is
what makes his arrest and jailing for merely voting so concerning; there appears to be no place more appropriate for him to
vote than Alamance. "I didn't know .. . I thought I was practicing my right," he told the New York Times when describing his
1

Keith Sellars, Keith Sellars: Threatened with Prisonfor Voting, FAYETTEVILLE

OBSERVER (Nov. 3, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.fayobserver.com/article/
20181103/OPINION/ 181109470 [https://perma.cc/DDH9-YXCN]; see Jack
Healy, Arrested, Jailedand Charged with a Felony. For Voting., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/us/arrested-voting-north-caro
lina.html [https://perma.cc/N97V-L3M9].
2 Sellars, supra note 1.
3 Id.
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arrest.4 Mr. Sellars was one of twelve people in Alamance
County who were charged with violating North Carolina's felon
disenfranchisement law during the 2016 election. 5 The state's
law bars people on felony probation or parole from voting. 6
Moreover, nine of the twelve were black, which drew the nation's attention to North Carolina's history of suppressing black
votes.7 "It smacks of Jim Crow," commented Barrett Brown,
the head of Alamance County's NAACP. 8
Mr. Brown's comment is far from the first to compare that
modem felon disenfranchisement to Jim Crow. For years, felon
disenfranchisement has been hotly criticized for being a government-sanctioned tool of white supremacy. Critics contend-with substantial empirical support-that "[flelony
disenfranchisement policies have a disproportionate impact on
communities of color."9 Consider that black citizens are over
four times more likely to be disenfranchised than nonblack
citizens, and that one of every thirteen black citizens in the
United States has been or is currently subject to disenfranchisement.1 0 The racialized effects of disenfranchisement
are painful on both macro- and micro-levels. Not only does
felon disenfranchisement siphon political power from communities, it curtails civic engagement on the individual level.
Taranta Holman, who was also arrested for voting in Alamance
County, had never voted before 2016.11 Now, regardless of
whether Mr. Holman is found guilty of illegal voting, he says he
will never vote again-it will always be "too much of a risk."12
The American public has taken notice of felon disenfranchisement's negative effects. Polls indicate that citizens
across the United States strongly support extending the vote to
ex-felons living within the community.' 3 And rightfully so,
given the large volume of legal and academic scholarship criticizing felon disenfranchisement policies.' 4 In response to pub4

Healy, supra note 1.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

8

Id.
Id.

9

JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER

2 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/P523-E56P].
10

Id.

Healy, supra note 1.
Id.
Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisementin the
United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 283 (2004).
14
There is substantial criticism against felon disenfranchisement policies
specifically for preserving historic structures of white supremacy. See, e.g.,
11

12
13
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lic pressure to re-enfranchise felons, state actors have made
significant mitigating changes to their disenfranchisement policies. As of 2018, twenty-three states have made alterations to
their laws that re-enfranchised thousands of citizens.1 5
Many of these alterations have come from leading state
executives. For example, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
issued Executive Order No. 181 in April 2018 which restored
the right to vote to 35,000 New York parolees.1 6 Former Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear1 7 granted over 9,000 restoration
requests between 2007 and 2015, while former Iowa Governor
Tom Vilsack'I issued Executive Order No. 42, which restored
voting rights to an estimated 115,000 Iowans for over six
years. 19 Current Iowa governor Kim Reynolds has made restoring voting rights to felons one of her administration's key priorities. 2 0 She called for Iowan legislators to amend the state
constitution's disenfranchisement provision in her 2019 Condition of the Address, stating:
Shadman Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: FelonDisenfranchisementas a Badge of
Slavery, 46 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 223 (2015) (contending that felon disenfranchisement should be challenged on Thirteenth Amendment grounds). But see
Roger Clegg et al., The CaseAgainst Felon Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1 (2008) (arguing in favor of felon disenfranchisement laws).
15

MORGAN MCLEOD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: Two DEC-

ADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM 3 (2018), https://www.sentencing-

project.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote- 1997-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3BP-BXFQ].
16 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_ 181.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LE2AVJL]; see Sasha Abramsky, At Long Last, Andrew Cuomo Restores the Vote for
New York Parolees, NATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/
[https://
at-long-last-andrew-cuomo-restores-the-vote-for-new-york-parolees/
perma.cc/X35U-YYPA].
17 Morgan Watkins, Gov. Bevin Restores Ex-Felons' Civil Rights for the First
Time, COURIER JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://www.courier-journal
.com/story/news/politics/201 7/04/03/gov-bevin-restores-felons-civil-rights/
99982776/ [https://perma.cc/G8M8-PEJJ].
18 Kate Zernike, Iowa Governor Will Give Felons the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/18/us/iowa-governorwill-give-felons-the-right-to-vote.html [https://perma.cc/GJ4G-7CUB].
19 Executive Order 42 was rescinded by former governor Vilsack's successor
Terry Branstad. Makeda Yohannes, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Iowa,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analy
sis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-fowa [https://perma.cc/8ST9-LBHZ] [hereinafter Yohannes, Iowa].
20 Barbara Rodriguez & Stephen Gruber-Miller, Iowa PoWl Nearly Two-thirds
of Iowans Say Felons Should Regain Voting Rights After Completing Sentence, DES
MOINES REGISTER (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/
news/politics/iowa-poll/ 2019/02/17/iowa-poll-felon-voting-rights-restoreprison-crime-vote-election-2020-kim-reynolds-ia-constitution/2875580002/
(https://perma.cc/2H76-V8BJ].
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Through the power of clemency, the governor can restore
those rights, and I have done that 88 times since taking
office. But I don't believe that voting rights should be forever
stripped, and I don't believe restoration should be in the
hands of a single person. . .. Our founders gave us a process
to amend the constitution, should the passage of time change
our view. Let's begin that process now. I believe Iowans recognize the power of redemption; let's put this issue in their
hands. 2 1

And in 2016, former Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe immediately and categorically re-enfranchised all ex-felons in Virginia. 2 2 Although this order was ultimately overturned,
McAuliffe's office subsequently restored the voting rights of
over 172,000 impacted Virginia citizens on an individual
basis.23
State legislatures have also been active in re-enfranchising
felons. In 2016, California amended Section 2101 of the Elections Code to allow convicted felons sentenced to county jails to
vote while in custody. 2 4 And on November 6, 2018, Florida
voters restored voting rights to over one million Florida felons
via a constitutional amendment, which automatically restored
voting rights for the majority of people who have completed
their felony sentences. 2 5 Florida's amendment, in particular,
was a cheering victory for disenfranchisement reformists. Previously, Florida took a hardline stance against felon political
participation, permanently removing the right to vote from all
Floridians with prior felony convictions. 2 6
21 READ: Gov. Kim Reynolds' Full 2019 Condition of the State, DES MOINES
REGISTER (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/poli

tics/2019/01/ 15/iowa-gov-kim-reynolds-full-2019-condition-state-transcriptfelons-budget-republican-education-la/2580202002/
[https://perma.cc/9HZ42VVN].
22 Vann R. Newkirk II, How Letting Felons Vote Is Changing Virginia, ATLANTIC

(Jan. 8,2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/virginiaclemency-restoration-of-rights-campaigns/549830/ [https://perma.cc/JD8KM59D].
23

24

fJa
See A.B. 2466, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legisla

ture.ca.gov/faces/bllNavClient.xhtml?billid=201520160AB2466
[https://per
ma.cc/J993-RCYD].
25 See Nicole Chavez, Florida Restores Voting Rights to More Than I Million
Felons, CNN (Nov. 7, 2018, 4:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/poli

tics/florida-felons-voting-rights/index.html

[https://perma.cc/3CDS-L9DE].

26 See Makeda Yohannes, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/

voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida [https://perma.cc/E4NE-XQCA] [hereinafter Yohannes, Florida].
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However, few states have endorsed comprehensive felon
disenfranchisement reform. Many still bar ex-felons from the
ballot box. Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee maintain lifetime voting bans for felons convicted of murder or rape, regard27
less of whether such individuals complete their sentence.
Furthermore-in spite of their efforts at reform-Kentucky and
Iowa still maintain permanent voting bans for all prior and
current felons, although Iowa appears to be strongly considering amending its constitution's disenfranchisement provision.2 8 Only Maine and Vermont fully enfranchise felons, even
while they are incarcerated. 2 9
America requires sweeping felon re-enfranchisement, and
the time for reform is nigh. Felon disenfranchisement laws
perpetuate structural racism ingrained within the American
electoral system and criminal justice system by disproportionately affecting people of color, particularly those in the black
and Latinx communities. State amendments and public polling strongly suggest that the American public recognizes these
effects and favors re-enfranchisement. Thus, progressive reformists ought to strike now and push for re-enfranchisement
now, while the iron is hot.
The thesis of this Note is that felon disenfranchisement is a
modern Jim Crow regime whose reform has overwhelming public support, and that mere state gubernatorial reform a la
Cuomo, McAuliffe, and Beshear has dangerous consequences
for governmental legitimacy and interstate consistency. Because of this, reformists ought to pursue a federal legislative
solution-specifically, the Democracy Restoration Act-which
is constitutional under Article I of the Constitution, as well as
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Part I lays out a broad history of American felony disenfranchisement law. Part II argues that felon disenfranchisement laws need to be repealed as they disparately affect
marginalized, nonwhite communities and threaten the integrity
of the American electoral and criminal justice systems. Part II
then discusses the substantial empirical evidence that Americans recognize these detriments and are strongly in favor of
felon disenfranchisement reform. Part III then uses a close
27 State Felon Voting Rights, PROCON (Nov. 7, 2018), https://felonvoting.pro
con.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000286 (https://perma.cc/HGV5-9JN5].
28 Yohannes, Florida, supra note 26; see Rodriguez & Gruber-Miller, supra
note 20.
29

Felon Voting Rights, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISIATURES (Dec. 21,

2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-votingrights.aspx [https://perma.cc/NEQ6-M5ZGI.
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examination of previous Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe's
2016 Executive Order enacting mass re-enfranchisement to illustrate that-while gubernatorial action has been the dominant mode of felon disenfranchisement reform for the past two
decades-organizers ought to consider federal legislative action
for a more legitimate, more permanent solution. Part IV will
then advocate for and argue the constitutionality of the Democracy Restoration Act.3 0
I
BACKGROUND: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW

As a preliminary matter, this Note's discussion benefits
from a broad understanding of felon disenfranchisement law's
history. A fuller understanding of disenfranchisement's problematic entrenchment in America's political and societal structures at large bolsters this Note's argument that the nation
requires a comprehensive federal legislative solution to the
problem of disenfranchisement. 3 1
A.

Felony Disenfranchisement's Roots in Jim Crow Law

Felon disenfranchisement law is primarily a Western construct, stemming from the Greek and Roman traditions of "civil
death," which penalized criminals by removing their political
rights, such as the right to vote in the general assembly.32
Great Britain called their system of disenfranchisement "outlawry" and imported the penalty to their American colonies,
which typically used disenfranchisement as a punishment for
"morally repugnant" crimes.3 3
Following the American Revolution, the vast majority of
state constitutions maintained felon and other disenfranchisement provisions intended to preserve "the purity of the ballot
Democracy Restoration Act of 2018, H.R. 6612, 115th Cong. (2018).
See infra Part III.
32
See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Indeed, the
practice of disenfranchising those convicted of crimes is of ancient origin... . [I]n
ancient Athens, the penalty for certain crimes was placement in a state of 'infamy,' which entailed the loss of those rights.. .. The Roman Republic also
employed infamy as a penalty. . . .").
33
See, e.g., Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisementwith
Citizen Theory, 22 HARV. BIACKLETIER L.J. 53, 54-56 (2006) (describing pre-American methods of felon disenfranchisement); George Brooks, Comment, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851,
852-53 (2005) ("The first disenfranchisement laws in America appeared in the
1600s, typically as punishment for morality crimes such as drunkenness, and
were present from the earliest times of the Republic." (footnote omitted)).
30

31
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box." 3 4 These laws were legitimized by Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, reading "the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each States shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."36
In the late 1800s, states-especially those in what would
become the Jim Crow South-began to weaponize felon disenfranchisement laws in response to the 1870 ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which attempted to extend the vote to
male citizens regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."3 6 The following excerpted material from the 1868
Constitutional Convention of South Carolina following the Civil
War illustrates white supremacy's mobilization of felon disenfranchisement to obstruct nonwhite votes.
The Legislature of 1865 . . . enacted laws which made the
most trivial offence a felony, and the intent of those laws was
to deprive every colored man of their [sic] right of citizenship.
If a colored man struck a white man, all he had to do was go
before an officer of the law, and declare that the colored man
struck him with intent to kill, and that offence, according to
37
the law of 1865, constituted a felony.
At this time, South Carolina had disenfranchised criminals
who had been convicted of what were considered "black crimes"
including "thievery, adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreaking, and attempted rape," but not including murder or fighting.3 8 Likewise, Mississippi politicians reframed state
disenfranchisement laws that had previously disenfranchised
all convicts to specifically and exclusively target people convicted of minor "black crimes" including burglary, theft, and
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (affirming conviction for
34
illegal voting in violation of Alabama's felon disenfranchisement provision).
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting
Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisementof Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
727, 733 (1998) (describing the cycle of minority disenfranchisement); Kamala
Kelkar, This Year, Laws with Roots to the Civil War Prevented 6.1 Million from
Voting, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
civil-war-laws-prevented-voting [https://perma.cc/VT4Y-C4PE] (discussing history of American felon disenfranchisement reform); Brooks, supra note 33, at 857
(recounting the use of disenfranchisement tools in the Jim Crow South).
37 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 540 (J.
Woodruff ed., Charleston, Denny & Perry, 1868) (statement of Delegate T.J.
Robertson).
38
Brooks, supra note 33, at 858 (quoting Nathan P. Litwin, Note, Defending
an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush Upheld Felon Disenfranchisementand
Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 236, 238 (2003)).
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arson.3 9 And in Virginia, state delegate and future United
States Senator Carter Glass asserted that the purpose of the
state's felon disenfranchisement law was to "eliminate the
darkey as a political factor in this State ...
so that in no single
county of the Commonwealth will there be the least concern felt
for the complete supremacy of the white race in the affairs of
government."4 0
Suffice to say that felon disenfranchisement policies, along
with poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and literacy tests, became
means for white supremacists to "socially and politically exclude[] [African Americans] from full participation in the life of
the nation." 4 1 Even more dangerously, felon disenfranchisement provisions enacted to comprehensively bar black Americans from the ballot box were facially legal-both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments explicitly allow for the
disenfranchisement of felons. 4 2 Indeed, while most Jim Crow
laws were ultimately found to be unconstitutional, covertly
racialized felon disenfranchisement laws were and still continue to be held constitutional by courts. 4 3
This is not to say that felon disenfranchisement laws
stayed static per se. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s
placed particular emphasis on the right to vote as a means of

39 See CHUNG, supra note 9, at 3 (citing Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and
the DisappearingVoters, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF

MASS IMPRISONMENT 50-58 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
40 2 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Dele-

gate Carter Glass).
41
Brooks, supranote 33, at 857; see Hench, supra note 36, at 733-37.
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
("But when the right to vote at any election .

.

. is denied . . . or in any way

abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced . . . .").
43 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elec., 360 U.S. 45, 51-53
(1959) (listing a previous criminal record in a list of factors states may consider
when determining voter qualifications); Green v. Bd. of Elec. of N.Y.C., 380 F.2d
445, 449 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that disenfranchisement was not a punishment,
but rather "a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise"). See
generally Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction,and Application of State
CriminalDisenfranchisementProvisions, 10 A.L.R.6th 31 (2006) (analyzing all federal and state cases up to 2006 discussing the validity of felony disenfranchisement laws). In writing the majority opinion for Green, Second Circuit Judge Henry
Friendly contended that criminals did not elect government actors that would
pass laws in their favor especially given "the heavy incidence of recidivism and the
prevalence of organized crime." Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
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political participation.4 4 In response, many legislatures moved

to mitigate the effects of their felon disenfranchisement provisions by either eliminating lifetime disenfranchisement or narrowing the range of qualifying felonies.4 5 In spite of the shift in
public policy, courts remained staunch in their refusal to directly address the discriminatory effects of disenfranchisement.
Even in cases where felon disenfranchisement provisions
were struck down, courts shied away from discussing the
racialized impact of disenfranchisement. Consider for instance
the 1970 New Jersey District Court case Stephens v. Yeoman,
which struck down the state's felon disenfranchisement statute but skirted the discussion of race entirely.46 The majority
opinion held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause 4 7 of the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Kramer v. Union Free School District
that disenfranchising classifications must be tailored with an
"exacting standard of precision" necessary to achieve an articulable state goal. 4 8 The court found that the statute's "haphazard development" had led to "totally irrational and
inconsistent classification[s]" that could not meet the exacting
standard of precision required by the Equal Protection
Clause.4 9 Likewise, the Supreme Court of California eschewed
the opportunity to discuss the racial impact of felon disenSee Abigail M. Hinchcliff, Note, The "Other" Side of Richardson v. Ramirez:
44
A Textual Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement, 121 YALE L.J. 194, 203 (2011)
(describing the Civil Rights movement and its effects on voting rights law).
45
Id.
Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (striking
46
down N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(2)-(5)).
47 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
.no State shall ...
amend. XIV, § 1. The clause has been read to mandate
CONsT.
U.S.
laws."
the
of
that, while the government may classify individuals based on group characteristics, these classifications must relate to legitimate government purposes. See,
e.g., Beth A. Deverman, Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection:The Supreme
Court'sProhibitionof Gender-BasedPeremptory Challenges, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1028, 1029 (1995) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause in the context

of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), a case prohibiting the exercise of
preemptory challenges based on the gender of potential jurors).
Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. at 1186 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
48
395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969)) ("[Tihe classifications must be tailored so that the
exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the
articulated state goal. Section 2012 [of New York Education Law] does not meet
the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise.").
See Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. at 1188. For example, an individual convicted
49
of murder under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:4-1 would be disenfranchised, whereas an
individual convicted of attempted murder would still be eligible to vote. See id.
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franchisement laws when striking down California's disenfranchisement law in the 1973 case Ramirez v. Brown.5 0
In conclusion, there was virtually zero judicial discussion
of striking down felon disenfranchisement laws on racial discrimination grounds prior to Richardson v. Ramirez, in spite of
their clear roots in Jim Crow law and other antiblack policies.
And once Richardson v. Ramirez was announced, a successful
challenge to felon disenfranchisement law on racial discrimination grounds became even more improbable.
B.

Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) and Subsequent Cases

Richardson v. Ramirez-decided by a divided Supreme
Court in 1971 5 1-is the most important case for any pro-disenfranchisement defender and the largest hurdle for any disenfranchisement reformist. 5 2 Richardson v. Ramirez holds that
felon disenfranchisement in and of itself is constitutional
under the Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, began his review by noting that felon disenfranchisement challenges implicate both the Equal Protection Clause5 3 and Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, otherwise known as the Penalty
50 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1973), overruled by Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Rather, the California Supreme Court found that

the state's broad disenfranchisement of the state's current and previous felons
violated the equal protection clause when such disenfranchisement was not necessary to achieve the state's goal of minimizing voter fraud. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at
1356-57.
51

418 U.S. 24 (1974). The Supreme Court also decided O'Brien v. Skinner in

1974, another felon voting rights case. In O'Brien, plaintiffs were jailed New York
citizens who were legally eligible to vote-they either had not been convicted of a
crime yet or else had been merely convicted of a misdemeanor. Despite their
eligibility, correctional and election officials refused to provide them with absentee
ballots, registration equipment, or transportation to the polls per the direction of
New York statutes. The Supreme Court found that the statutes were unconstitu-

tional, as they created an unconstitutionally onerous burden on the New York
citizens' ability to vote. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974); see also
Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote From the County Jail, ATLANTIc (Nov. 4,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/1 1 /organtzers-flghttum-out-vote-county-jails/574783/ [https://perma.cc/5QAE-SAY9] (describing

the modern hurdles that individuals held without a felony conviction face in order
to vote).
52
Richardsonv. Ramirez is still good law today, four decades later. Hinchcliff
observes "[G]iven that the Court has shown no interest in reconsidering the Ramirez ruling, strategies that seek to overturn the decision are likely to fail. Post-

Ramirez legal challenges to disenfranchisement have generally been unsuccessful, as courts have found the topic to be a 'settled issue."' Hinchcliff, supra note
44, at 197 (footnote omitted).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§

1.
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Clause.5 4 The Court first found that the language of the Penalty Clause expressly carved out an exemption for states that
55
disenfranchised participants "in rebellion, or other crime."
The Court then held that the Equal Protection Clause "could
not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction[s]" of the Penalty Clause. 56
When Richardson v. Ramirez was decided in 1974, the majority of states had lifetime felon disenfranchisement provisions.5 7 The effect of the case was to cement the
constitutionality of those bans, especially given the Supreme
Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolder.5 8 Although Mobile did not
involve felon disenfranchisement, 5 9 it held that the disproportionate effects of racial discrimination alone were irrelevant to
finding a provision unconstitutional, unless there was evidence
that such discrimination was purposeful.6 0 The cumulative
effect of Richardson v. Ramirez and Mobile was that plaintiffs
wishing to challenge specific felon disenfranchisement provisions on the grounds of racial discrimination had to prove purposeful discrimination in the drafting of such provisions. That
is to say, disparate effects-no matter how shocking-would
not be enough to support a felon disenfranchisement challenge. Indeed, the nation saw such a challenge play out in
Hunter v. Underwood,6 1 which challenged section 182 of the
Alabama Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of
crimes "involving moral turpitude" as determined by the State
Attorney General. 62 The Court held that section 182 was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, as it not only
had a disproportionate impact on black citizens, but was
54 The relevant section of the Penalty Clause reads: "But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend.

XIV, §

2.

Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 42-43.
56 Id. at 55.
57
See Hinchcliff, supranote 44, at 208.
58 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Mobile v. Bolden held that disproportionate discriminatory effect alone59
without evidence of purposeful discrimination-would not support a claim of
racial voting discrimination. See id.
60
See id. at 65.
61 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
62
Id. at 223.
55
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overtly and explicitly adopted with racially discriminatory intent during the Jim Crow era. 6 3
C.

The Current State of U.S. Felon Disenfranchisement
Law

Today, forty-eight out of the fifty states retain some form of
felon disenfranchisement.64 Only Maine and Vermont allow
convicted populations to vote without any restriction.6 5 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement since Richardson v. Ramirez
and Hunter, challenges to felon disenfranchisement have continued to come before the lower courts.
In particular, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)6 6 has
been carefully considered by scholars as a potential tool to
challenge felon disenfranchisement policy. 6 7 Reformists have
not shrunk from testing the VRA's viability as a point of reform.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit heard Farrakhanv. Washington,6 8 which examined the constitutionality of Washington
State's felon disenfranchisement law under section 2 of the
VRA. 6 9 Although the circuit court did not find that the law
violated the VRA, the court did use the act as a framework
63
See id. at 233 ("[We are confident that § 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the
enactment and operation of § 182 [of the Alabama Constitution] which otherwise
violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging CriminalDisenfranchisementUnder the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy,
103 YALE L.J. 537, 547 (1993) ("The plaintiffs [in Underwood] brought an action in
federal court claiming that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution, under which
they had been disenfranchised, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because it was adopted with intent to discriminate against blacks
and was fulfilling its intended effect.").
64 CHUNG, supra note 9, at 2.
65 Id. Additionally, Maine and Vermont do not restrict the voting rights of
felons while they are serving their sentences in prison.
66 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) protects minority
communities from discriminatory voting practices by prohibiting literacy tests,
requiring non-English ballots and voting instructions, and authorizing other nondiscrimination measures. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.comell.edu/wex/votingrights-act [https://perma.cc/5NDW-BFZK].
67 Many academics have considered how the VRA may be used to challenge
felon disenfranchisement policies. See, e.g., Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon DisenfranchisementConstitutes Vote Denial UnderSection
Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERIY L.J. 61 (2011); Lauren
Handelsman, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1875 (2005);
Thomas G. Varnum, Let's Not Jump to Conclusions: Approaching Felon Disenfranchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109
(2008).
68 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
69
See id. at 1014.
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within which to consider how the challenged law engaged with
social and historical evidence of racial bias against the state's
black voters. 7 0 But not all courts have been willing to consider
striking down felon disenfranchisement policies. Consider the
Eleventh Circuit's case Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida.7 1 There, the court essentially defanged Hunter when considering Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision by
contending that a modem revision of the original felon disenfranchisement provision "removed the discriminatory taint"
from said original, even if the original provision had been motivated by racial animus in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause.72
In sum, it is unclear whether federal courts will ever in
practice strike down a felon disenfranchisement provision for
racial discrimination on either Hunter or VRA-based grounds.
As of now, no post-Hunter courts have struck down any felon
disenfranchisement provision, on any grounds. Therefore,
felon disenfranchisement reformists ought not to rely on the
courts, even post-Hunter, for relief. However, the absence of
judicial action does not mean that reform should slow, not by
any means. The deleterious effects of felon disenfranchisement
laws on America's institutions are too serious to be ignored.
This leads this Note to its next section, which contends first
that felon disenfranchisement has particularly injurious effects
on communities of color and second that the nation is ready to
remedy such effects via mass re-enfranchisement.
II
AMERICA, READY FOR FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
REFORM?

A.

Felon Disenfranchisement is a Modem Jim Crow Law

Imagine the State of Missouri. Missouri is the eighteenthlargest state by population in the nation, with a citizenship of
See id. at 1016 ("As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court
70
that Plaintiffs' claim of vote denial is cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA. Felon
disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and Section 2 is clear that any voting
qualification that denies citizens the right to vote in a discriminatory manner
violates the VRA.").
405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
71
Id. at 1224 ("Florida's re-enactment of the felon disenfranchisement provi72
sion in the 1968 Constitution conclusively demonstrates that the state would
enact this provision even without an impermissible motive and did enact the
provision without an impermissible motive.").
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slightly over six million.7 3 Missouri makes up nearly two percent of the nation's entire population and receives eight seats
in the House of Representatives. 7 4 Now, consider the numerical effect of banning Missouri's entire population from the voting booth. Consider the visual effect of removing that large of a
group from the voting pool. It should shock you.
This figure approximates the effects of felon disenfranchisement, albeit focused in one geographical area. As of
2018, felon disenfranchisement policies remove the ability to
vote from over six million Americans across the nation-a population larger than that of Missouri.7 5 It easily constitutes the
largest population of the disenfranchised in the world.7 6 As
Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza note, "no
other contemporary democracy disenfranchises felons to the
same extent, or in the same manner, as the United States."7 7
Approximately one in every forty Americans within the votingage population has lost the right to vote-either temporarily or
permanently-by felon disenfranchisement policies.7 8 Over
three-quarters of the disenfranchised population are not even
physically in prison; some are on parole or probation, while
others have already completed their sentences. 7 9
America's six million disenfranchised citizens is one of the
most tangible consequences springing from the nation's mass
incarceration philosophy. The United States produce nearly a
quarter of the globe's prisoners, despite making up only five

73

Population Estimates. U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU,

https://www.census.gov/

quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217?# [https://perma.cc/9UPW-UPYE] (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018) (search "Missouri").
74
Missouri Population2019, WORLD POPULATION REvIEW (Nov. 30, 2018), http:/
/worldpopulationreview.com/states/missouri-population/ (https://perma.cc/
U8QA-VMPCI.
75
See Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://
www.house.gov/representatives [https://perma.cc/K9LY-VPPW] ("The number of
voting representatives in the House is fixed by law at no more than 435, proportionally representing the population of the 50 states.") (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
76
See Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the "Menaceof Negro
Domination": Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,
1850-2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 560 (2003).
77 Id. at 562 (citing JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United
States (1998)).
78
Elena Holodny, Millions of American Adults Are Not Allowed to Vote - And
They Could Change History, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.businessin
sider.com/what-if-felons-could-vote-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/N5K8-DHCD].
79
Id.
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percent of the world population, 0 and the nation easily has the
highest rate of incarceration in the world."' Today, there are
2
2.3 million people imprisoned in the United States. 8 Annually, approximately 650,000 of these men and women are freed
each year-many of whom are then left without the ability to
8 3 In fact,
vote, despite being "restored" to their communities.
over ninety-five percent of those incarcerated will eventually be
released.8 4 No wonder then, given these statistics, there are so
many ex-felons in the United States subjected to disenfranchisement. Moreover, although mass incarceration rates
show signs of declining, albeit slightly, researchers expect the
number of ex-felons to increase as individuals are released.
However, even more problematic is the stark racialization of
mass incarceration, and hence the same racialization of felon
disenfranchisement. Certainly, felon disenfranchisement policies are race-neutral on their face. But their effects are far from
neutral.
In order to fully comprehend the disparate effects of felon
disenfranchisement law on nonwhite communities, it behooves
us to first look at statistics illustrating the way in which mass
incarceration unduly affects nonwhite individuals. There has
been much academic discussion of racism in the American
imprisonment scheme.8 5 Michelle Alexander writes:
80 See Mass Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-jus
tice/mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/Z8H7-ZKZK] (last visited Aug. 9,
2019).
81

See DEvAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRImE, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS

INCARCERATION 22 (2007) (examining the impact of mass incarceration on exfelons).
82 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration:The Whole Pie 2018,

PRISON POLICY (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2O18.
html [https://perma.cc/3TEQ-59YU].
83 Prisoners and PrisonerRe-Entry, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.jus

tice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu-reentry.html

[https://perma.cc/2DND-9SEG]

(last visited Aug. 9, 2019).

84

Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United

States, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/reentry.cfm [https://perma.cc/R5NR-AVM7] (reflecting that at least

95% of all state prisoners will be released from prison at some point); see also
PAGER, supra note 81, at 22 ("Apart from the small number of offenders imprisoned for life, the vast majority are released back into the community after a few
years of confinement.")
See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-RacialRacisr Racial Stratification and
85
Mass Incarcerationin the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023 (2010) (contending

that election of Barack Obama did not necessarily translate to a shift in racial
attitudes within the context of mass incarceration); Michael O'Hear, Mass IncarceratioreThe Fiscal& Social Costs, STATE BAR OF WIS. (June 1, 2018), https://www
.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume
=91&Issue=6&ArticlelD=26397 [https://perma.cc/95CW-WXAS] (discussing
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No other country in the world imprisons so many of its racial
or ethnic minorities. The United States imprisons a larger
percentage of its black population than South Africa did at
the height of apartheid. In Washington, D.C., . . . three out of
four young black men (and nearly all those in the poorest
neighborhoods) can expect to serve time in prison. Similar
rates of incarceration can be found in black communities
across America. 8 6

There is overwhelming evidence that black- and Latinx-identified individuals are disparately represented in prison populations.87 The 2010 Census found that black Americans were
five times more likely to be incarcerated than their white counterparts."" Indeed, while black Americans comprise around
thirteen percent of the nation's overall population, they make
up a shocking forty percent of the federal and state prison
population.8 9 Compare this statistic to parallel figures for
white Americans. White Americans comprise approximately
sixty-four percent of the nation's overall population but make
up a mere thirty percent of the same federal and state prison
population. 9 0 Black men are incarcerated at a rate of 4,340 per
100,000 Americans.9 1 Black women are incarcerated at a rate
of 260 per 100,000 Americans. 9 2 These figures average out to
approximately 2,303 black individuals incarcerated per
Wisconsin's prison system in light of the "spatial inequality of incarceration"
appearing in main cities, such as Milwaukee); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Mass
IncarcerationofAfi-can-American Males: A Return to InstitutionalizedSlavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisementof ConstitutionalRights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L.

REv. 559 (2007) (exploring how the mass incarceration of black men is a modem
reconception of involuntary servitude).
86

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 6-7 (rev. ed. 2012).
87 See Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and SpatialDistribution
of People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY
1795, 1796-99 (2017); see, e.g., Weatherspoon, supranote 85; PAGER, supranote
81; ALEXANDER, supra note 86 (discussing the effects of mass incarceration on

black communities and the way in which "colorblindness" minimizes such
effects).

88

Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarcerationin the 2010 Census: State-

by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL'Y (May 28, 2014),

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/8HJFXQwN.
89 Id.; see also Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America's High IncarcerationRate,
CNN (July 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarcera
tion-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.ce/T9XH-PHCV] (reporting similar

figures).
90 Sakala, supra note 88.
91

Ta-Nehisi Coates, Mapping the New Jim Crow, ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2019),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/mapping-the-new-jimcrow/381617/ [https://perma.cc/EG23-BZ4Z].
92
Id.
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100,000 Americans. 9 3 This trend is historically grounded;
black imprisonment rates have exceeded white rates at least
since the Civil War, if not for far longer.9 4
Latinx- and Afro-Latinx identifying people face similar
treatment from the America criminal justice system. According
to the 2010 Census, Latinx people are twice as likely to be
incarcerated as whites. Although they make up sixteen percent of the population, they constitute nearly twenty percent of
the U.S. incarcerated population. Moreover, Latinx individuals
face a starkly increased likelihood of drug conviction. A shocking majority of persons convicted of federal marijuana crimes
identify as Latinx, making up seventy-seven percent of marijuana sentences, despite constituting less than twenty percent
the nation's population.9 5 Thus, we conclude that mass incarceration is critically racialized, in a way that unfairly and disparately affects black and Latinx-identified citizens.
The data on felony convictions shows a similarly problematic trend. A study9 6 conducted by sociology professors across
the United States found that black persons in particular are
disparately affected by felony conviction.
By 2010, all but one state (Maine) had a felony conviction rate
of at least 5 % of adult African Americans. . . . Most strikingly, rates in five states exceeded 20 %, meaning that one in
five African American adults in these states had at some
point been under felony supervision (California, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Washington).... Where state rates
are higher, a greater share of the population will be subject to
the formal and informal collateral consequences of felony
conviction... . These discriminatory effects are amplified for
African American communities . . .97

The statistics regarding both mass incarceration and felony
conviction unequivocally demonstrate the racialized nature of
the criminal justice system.
The consequences of disparate treatment of nonwhiteand especially black-individuals at the conviction and imprisonment stages unsurprisingly results in parallel results post93

Sakala, supra note 88.

94 Behrens et al., supra note 76, at 560.
95 Steven Nelson, Latinos Got 77 Percentof Federal Pot Sentences Last Year,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/T9TW-EHLK. Nelson also notes
that about eighty percent of crack cocaine sentences have African American
defendants.
96 Shannon et al., supra note 87, at 1811.
97 Id. at 1811-12. This Note recognizes that Shannon et al. were unable to
provide estimates for Latinx people and felony convictions, as there were significant gaps within criminal justice data series for such individuals.
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conviction. According to the Sentencing Project, one in every
thirteen adult black citizens is affected by felony disenfranchisement laws.98 This is four times the rate at which
nonblack persons are disenfranchised. 9 9 Behrens, Uggens,
and Manza conducted an empirical study in 2003 noting the
relationship between "racial threat," or white anxieties that
nonwhite voters would achieve politically parity, and the continued existence of felon disenfranchisement laws. 100
In considering political parity, it is important to keep focus
the
fundamental importance of the right to vote. That is,
on
when nonwhite individuals are barred from the vote, they have
diminished electoral power that affects their ability to engage
with and influence state and national legislation. Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza comment that "disenfranchisement rates
can affect elections by diminishing the electoral power of minority groups, the results of which affect a state's-and the
nation's-" electorate, political movement, and legislation as a
whole. 10 1 Moreover, they note that states with higher rates of
imprisoned citizens have lower access and quality of health
care for all citizens.1 0 2 There is a similar detrimental effect that
occurs on a more microscale within individual communities.
Giovanna Shay notes the long-term effect of disenfranchisement on these communities beyond the loss of voting rights to
individual felons:
Disenfranchisement is not the only way that mass incarceration reduces the political power of poor communities; because the incarcerated are counted as residents in the
jurisdictions where they are imprisoned for the purposes of
legislative reapportionment, their home districts lose political
influence.10 3
Moreover, felon disenfranchisement contributes to the psychological effects of incarceration that push ex-felons towards
recidivism. There is extensive research indicating that exfelons who receive strong community support and who can reenter society with employment and social ties are less likely to

supra note 9, at 2.
See id. ("Black Americans of voting age are more than four times more
likely to lose their voting rights than the rest of the adult population. .").
100 See Behrens et al., supra note 76, at 598.
101 See Shannon et al., supra note 87, at 1811.
98

CHUNG,

99

102
103

Id.
Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14

(2010) (footnote omitted).
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re-engage in criminal activities. 1 0 4 Consequences of a felony
conviction can contribute to stigmatization that cuts against an
ex-felon's ability to fully re-enter society. 0 5 Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith and Matt Vogel assert that "[miany individuals who
are subject to disenfranchisement laws speak of disenfranchisement as a symbol that they do not belong, and that
they are outsiders in their own community."' 0 6
In conclusion, felon disenfranchisement laws have a long
and storied history rooted in racism, that today manifests itself
in disparate and dangerous consequences for nonwhite exfelons. In particular, black and Latinx Americans are subject
to political inequity and increased bars to re-entering society.
B.

Americans Support Felon Disenfranchisement Reform

This Note moves to argue that, despite the ubiquity of felon
disenfranchisement provisions across the states, there is robust evidence-both empirical and sociological-indicating
that the American public is overwhelmingly in favor of mitigating, if not abolishing, felon disenfranchisement entirely.
Consider first that felon disenfranchisement laws have undergone substantial modification in recent years. Since 1997,
twenty-four states have made mitigating changes to their felony disenfranchisement laws.10 7 In 1997, Texas repealed the
two-year waiting period for ex-felons to have their rights
restored. 0 s Between 2000 and 2010, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, and New Mexico repealed their lifetime disenfranchisement provisions, replacing them with less harsh
alternatives. 0 9 And in November 2018, Florida restored the
right of one million ex-felons to vote by amending the Florida
104

See, e.g.,

JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISEN-

106

Id. at 414.

107

See CHUNG, supra note 9, at 4-6.
Id. at 5.
ICL

108
109

&

(2006); Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith
Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407 (2012); Nancy Leong, Allowing
Felons to Vote Could Prevent Crime, TAKE CARE (July 27, 2017), https://takecare
blog.com/blog/allowing-felons-to-vote-could-prevent-crime [https://perma.cc/
U3M4-NCBS].
105
Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 104, at 408 ("A frequently-made argument made against disenfranchisement is that it further isolates and segregates
ex-felons re-entering into society by denying them the ability to participate in the
political process. This isolation and segregation, in turn, is counterproductive to
the rehabilitative ideals of the criminal justice system. If, arguendo, the primary
goal of the American criminal justice system is to reduce crime, then policies that
result in increased crime rates make little sense." (footnote omitted)).
FRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
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constitution to re-enfranchise those who "complete all terms of
their sentence including parole or probation.""1 0 These
changes have led to an estimated 1,840,000 citizens being reenfranchised.111
This Note contends that increased mitigation to felon disenfranchisement laws directly reflects the American public's
shift in favor towards re-enfranchising felons and ex-felons. A
study conducted by Uggen, Manza, and Behrans found via a
recent national poll that eighty percent of Americans favor restoring voting rights to former felons and that sixty percent of
Americans favor restoring voting rights to current individuals
on probation or parole.11 2 Manza, Uggen, and Clem Brooks, in
a separate article, describe how, over time, a "civil liberties
view" has developed within the American public that "prevails
over a punitive view that would deny political rights to nonincarcerated felons."" 3 Manza, Uggen, and Brooks continue:
For all categories of felons who are not currently in prison,
relatively large majorities . . . favor enfranchisement. Additionally, we find evidence that between 60 and 68 percent of
the public believes that felony probationers ... should have
their voting rights restored. Moreover, 60 percent support
voting rights for parolees . .. and 66 percent support voting
rights for even ex-felons convicted of a violent crime who have
served their entire sentence. 114
What is the reason for the public's warming towards felon disenfranchisement reform? This Note proffers several arguments.
Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that there is increased
public attention towards civil rights and race issues. According
to Gallup, the number of Americans who "worry a 'great deal'
about race relations" has gone from seventeen percent to fortytwo percent between 2014 and 2017.11 According to Gallup
polls:
110 See Olivia B. Waxman, As FloridaRestores Ex-Felons' Right to Vote, Here's
the Dark History Behind Their Disenfranchisement,TIME (Nov. 8, 2018), http://
time.com/5448284/ex-felon-voting-rights-amendment-4-history-disenfranchise
ment/ [https://perma.cc/H85Z-FKFB] (citing the text of the Voter Restoration
Amendment).
111 See Holodny, supra note 78.
112 See Christopher Uggen et al., Felony Voting Rights and the Disenfranchisement of African Americans, 5 SouLs 48, 55 (2003).
113 Jeff Manza et al., supra note 13, at 283.
114

Id.

115 Art Swift, Americans' Worries About Race Relations at Record High, GALLUP
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/pol/206057/americans-worry-race-re
lations-record-high.aspx [https:/ /perma.cc/2PLP-ARR7].
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Race relations or racism has emerged as one of the top issues
on Gallup's most important problem list, rising from 1% to
3% of Americans mentioning the issue throughout much of
2014 to 18% doing so in July 2016 after incidents of violence
between police and black men . ... Mentions of this issue
have stayed at a monthly average of 9% since then." 6
Consider also the increased attention given to individual
voting habits, as galvanized by the elections of the last two
decades. Recent years have been characterized by a series of
tightly-contested United States elections.' 1 7 In 2000, the presidential election between Republic George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore was incredibly close. " I" The state that swung the
vote to Bush was Florida, which had and continues to have
extremely restrictive felon voting provisions."1 9 Many scholars,
including Manza and Uggen, contend that "[i]f disenfranchised
felons in Florida had been permitted to vote, Democrat [presidential-candidatel Gore would certainly have carried the state,
and the election."' 2 0 Manza and Uggen also point to disenfranchisement's possible influence on past elections, stating
that it would be likely that "some closely contested Democratic
political victories of the recent past might have gone to the
Republicans had contemporary rates of disenfranchisement
prevailed at the time."'21 The modem emphasis and approach
towards voting and civic duty implicitly shines a light on who is
able to vote and who is not, especially when un-incarcerated
parolees and ex-convicts are barred from voting, despite being
otherwise functioning members of society. This Note acknowledges that there likely are other factors contributing to the
nation's attitudes to re-enfranchisement. Suffice to say, however, there has been a substantial increase in felon disenfranchisement reform in recent years.

116

Id.

Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction?PoliticalConsequences of Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777,
779 (2002).
118 Id. at 792.
119 See id. ("[There are more disenfranchised felons in Florida, approximately
827,000, than in any other state.").
120
Id.
121
Id
117
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III
THE PROBLEM WITH REFORM VIA GUBERNATORIAL

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Much of modem felon disenfranchisement reform has
taken place via state executive action. More specifically,
through state governors' executive action and pardon powers.1 2 2 For example, Governor Cuomo-in response to the New
York legislature's failure to re-enfranchise state felons-announced that New York felons would be extended the right to
vote once they completed their sentence.1 2 3 This order allowed
New York felons on parole to vote. No doubt there is much to
admire about the governors who have used their offices' powers
to re-enfranchise state felons. Supporters of Virginia ex-governor Terry McAuliffe's 2016 blanket executive order re-enfranchising Virginia felons lauded him for embodying "the
powerful leadership needed across the nation to combat vestiges of de jure racial discrimination and recent retrenchment
on voting rights." 12 4

This Note asserts, however, that significant complications
emerge when governors exercise unilateral authority to re-enfranchise felons. In order to illustrate this, the following section closely interrogates McAuliffe's executive order and the
political drama that subsequently ensued. This case study
concludes that, while McAuliffe achieved short-term felon disenfranchisement reform, it impaired the ability of Virginia's
state governance to encourage political efficacy and bipartisanship. Moreover, McAuliffe's executive order was a mere bandaid skirting the actual issues of race and marginalization entrenched within the state's felon disenfranchisement provision.
A.

Case Study: The McAuliffe Executive Order (2016)

Terry McAuliffel 2 5 is a staunch figure within the Democratic establishment. An established party candidate and close
122 See Sam Levine, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo Is Restoring Voting Rights
to Felons on Parole, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/andrew-cuomo-new-york-voting-rights-parole us_5ad76d92e4bOe4
d0715c9a63 [https://perma.cc/ZVY4-VYU2]; see also supra INTRODUCTION (discussing voting restoration efforts by governors in Iowa and Kentucky).
123
See Levine, supra note 122.
124 Janal S. Nelson, Felon DisenfranchisementIs Anti-Democratic, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2016, 7:24 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/
22 /should-felons-ever-be-allowed-to-vote/felon-disenfranchisement-is-antidemocratic [https://perma.cc/KZH8-9WHP].
125 McAuliffe would serve as governor from 2014 to 2018, at which time he was
succeeded by fellow Democrat Ralph Northam.
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friend of Bill and Hillary Rodham Clinton, he was narrowly
elected the seventy-second governor of Virginia in 2013.126 At
the time of McAuliffe's election, Virginia-like the aforementioned states of Kentucky, Iowa, and Florida-maintained
highly-punitive lifetime felon disenfranchisement policies.
Furthermore, the state had one of the nation's highest levels of
disenfranchisement: 7.3 percent of the state's population could
not vote in 2010.127 Unsurprisingly, Virginia's disenfranchisement policies have strong ties to Jim Crow legislation. 1 2 8 Prior
to McAuliffe's election, his predecessors, both Democrat and
Republican, spent significant effort mitigating the state's felon
126

See Trip Gabriel, Terry McAuliffe, Democrat, Is Elected Governorof Virginia

in Tight Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/

us/politics/mcauliffe-is-elected-governor-in-virginia.html

[https://perma.cc/

AL96-MS2P].

127

See Danielle Kurtzleben, Virginia's GovernorJust Gave 206,000 People the

Right to Vote,

NPR (Apr. 22, 2016),

https://www.npr.org/2016/04/22/475

297932/virginias-governor-just-gave-206-000-ex-felons-the-right-to-vote
[https://perma.cc/2UGT-A9CC].
128

In 1902, in trend with the neighboring Southern states, Virginia repealed
its previous constitution, which placed very little restrictions on the electorate,
and replaced it with a far more restrictive document. This document was explic-

itly intended to politically disenfranchise black citizens; the president of the constitutional convention and a former Confederate colonel, John Goode, contended
that black citizens "had no capacity to participate in the functions of government."
Matt Ford, The Racist Roots of Virginia'sFelon Disenfranchisement,ATLANTIC (Apr.

27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/virginiafelon-disenfranchisement/480072/ [https://perma.cc/LD96-7X8U]. Virginia
delegate R.L. Gordon stated, "I told the people of my county before they sent me
here that I intended, as far as in me lay, to disenfranchise every negro that I could
disenfranchise under the Constitution of the United States, and as few white

people as possible." Id. Virginia delegate Carter Glass argued that felony disenfranchisement laws would "eliminate the darkey as a political factor in this State

in less than five years, so that in no single county . . . will there be the least
concern felt for the complete supremacy of the white race in the affairs of government." VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGs, supranote 40, at 3076; see also Dale E. Ho, Virginia
Needs to Fix Its Racist Voting Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2016), https://www
.nythmes.com/2016/07/19/opinion/virginia-needs-to-fix-its-racist-voting-law

.html [https://perma.cc/XJD2-MYJQI ("They were not shy about their intentions.
Virginia's new constitution would 'eliminate the darkey as a political factor,' explained [Delegate] Carter Glass . . . ."). As these quotes suggest, Virginia's delegates-much like their counterparts in the other Southern states-used the
"racial imbalances in the state's criminal-justice system" to tailor their disen-

.

franchisement laws to crimes they thought would affect black voters: "treason . .
any felony, bribery, petit larceny, obtaining money or property under false pretenses, embezzlement, forgery, or perjury." Ford, supra. This, combined with
literacy tests and poll taxes, affected Virginia's black voters profoundly: "By the
end of 1902, determined registrars and literacy tests had eliminated all but
21,000 of an estimated 147,000 blacks of voting age from the registration lists;
three years later, the new poll tax cut that number in half." J. DOUGLAS SMITH,
MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW VIRGINIA 26

(2002).

2019]1

LOCKED UP, THEN LOCKED OUT

1703

disenfranchisement provision.1 2 9 Former Virginia governor
Tim Kaine re-enfranchised over 4,400 felons between 2006 and
2010, and-towards the end of his term-conducted substantial research towards the possibility of granting a blanket resto30
ration of felon voting rights.o
In 2010, Kaine's successor,
Republican Robert F. McDonnell, removed the application process for individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies to have
their rights restored and eliminated the two-year waiting period
for restoration, in line with his campaign promise to re-enfranchise more felons than any other governor in Virginian
history.' 3 In 2013, McDonnell also proposed an amendment
to the Virginia Constitution to automatically restore voting
rights to nonviolent felons. 132 Although this proposal was
killed by the state's House of Delegates, McDonnell managed to
restore voting rights to over 5,000 nonviolent ex-offenders and
former felons over his four-year term as governor.1 3 3
Thus, it was not entirely unprecedented when, in April
2016, McAuliffe issued an aggressive and comprehensive executive order calling for the categorical pardon of all Virginia exfelons and a blanket restoration of ex-felon political rights. '3
McAuliffe's order relied on the powers enumerated in article V,
section 12 of the Virginia Constitution stating:
129

See Errin Whack, Va. Ramps Up Restoration of Voting Rights for Some Ex-

Felons, WASH. POST (July 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/vir

ginia-politics/restoring-voting-rights-of-some-va-ex-felons-ramping-up-at-endof-mcdonnells-term/2013/07/15/62455f4a-ed69-11 e2-alf9-ea873b7e0424_sto
ry.html?utmterm=.b8dfd3894f6a [https://perma.cc/4VJ6-J2HC).

130 See Letter from Mark E. Rubin, Counselor to the Governor, to Kent
Willis,
American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia 1 (Jan. 15, 2010).
131
See Errin Haines, Virginia's McDonnell on Pace to Restore Voting Rights
to
Record Number of Felons, WASH. PosT (Sept. 30, 2012), https://www.washing

tonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/mdonnell-on-pace-to-restore-voting-rightsto-record-number-of-felons/2012/09/30/7dfd9O2a-08bf-1 1e2-858a-5311 df86
abO4-story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.845e6f9e3323 [https://perma.cc/
HW8Y-6P5H].
132
See Josh Israel, Virginia GovernorAutomatically Restores Voting Rights to
Nonviolent Felons, THINK PROGRESS (May 29, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/

virginia-governor-automatically-restores-voting-rights-to-nonviolent-felonsbfa4baa3ce5a/ [https://perma.cc/2DNU-DSTM].
133 See Whack, supra note 129.

134 See Alexander Pringle, Comment, The Limits of Executive Clemency: How
the Virginia Supreme Court Blocked the Restoration of Felons' Political Rights in
Howell v. McAuliffe, 37 B.C. J.L. & Soc. JUST. 61, 61-62 (2016); see also Civil
Rights Groups File Amicus Brief in Virginia Restoration of Voting Rights Case,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (June 28, 2016) https://advancementproject.org/news/

civil-rights-groups-file-amicus-brief-in-virginia-restoration-of-voting-rights-case/
[https://perma.cc/SCS7-YQ34] (discussing Virginia's felon disenfranchisement
policies prior to the McAuliffe executive action).
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The Governor shall have power . . . to grant reprieves and
pardons after conviction except when the prosecution has
been carried on by the House of Delegates; [and] to remove
political disabilities consequent upon conviction for offenses
committed prior or subsequent to the adoption of this

Constitution. 135
However, this was the first time in Virginia's history that a
governor attempted to use the state's pardon power "on a categorical basis."1 3 6 The order immediately generated statewide
excitement. Supporters of the order applauded McAuliffe for
openly denouncing felon disenfranchisement's disproportion3 7 Detractors from the order
ate effects on black Virginians.1
responded that the order was motivated by McAuliffe's desire to
exploit the Democratic "felon vote" for then-Democratic presi38
CNN reporter Kayleigh
dential nominee Hillary Clinton.1
McEnany noted:
Adding .. . extra voters could most certainly make the difference in a state with just over 5 million registered voters. As
Politico reports, as of June 30, just 8,170 convicted felons
have taken the step of registering to vote, and these voters
tend to lean Democratic. This addition of new voters, however minute, could very well make a difference. As most recall, the 2000 election in Florida was determined by just a
few hundred votes, suggesting that the addition of thousands
of new voters could have a determinative effect on the electoral outcome this fall. 139

Others resisted McAuliffe's argument that re-enfranchising
felons was necessary to address the racist after-effects of Vir135 VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm,
Virginia Governor Restores Voting Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/us/govemor-terry-mcauliffe-virginiavoting-rights-convicted-felons.html [https://perma.ce/36M3-VBHJ] (discussing
McAuliffe's use of executive power to restore voting rights by "effectively over-

at disenturn[ing a Civil War-era provision in the state's Constitution aimed ...
franchising African-Americans").
136 L. Michael Berman, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 251,
267 (2017), (citing Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016)).
Graham Moomaw, Republicans Plan to Sue McAuliffe Over Order Restoring
137
Rights to Felons, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 2, 2016), http://www.richmond
.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_6fl 7684a-2425-5b3c-a3b9-

2aa9c3d4670a.html [https://perma.cc/5KP5-P2JTI.
138

See, e.g., Cal Thomas, The Felon Vote, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https:/

/www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/25/cal-thomas-the-felon-vote-invirginia/ [https://perma.cc/H7C7-M7JKI.

139

Kayleigh McEnany, The Court Case That Could Decide the 2016 Election,

CNN (July 18, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/opinions/howell-v-mc
auliffe-virginia-election-case-mcenany/index.html [https://perma.ce/XFD547BT).
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ginia's Jim Crow laws. A scathing opinion piece in the Washington Post lambasted McAuliffe for forcing protesters of the
executive order "to run a phony . .. racial gauntlet."1 4 0
The McAuliffe executive order provoked a strong political
backlash from the state's Republican-led legislature. The Republican Speaker of the House, William J. Howell, and the
Republican Majority Leader of the Senate, Thomas Norment,
Jr., quickly mobilized to file a lawsuit seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition against McAuliffe's categorical pardon. 141
After much public tension and debate, the Virginia Supreme Court struck down the McAuliffe order in the case of
HoweU v. McAuliffe.1 4 2 The court asserted that sweeping reenfranchisement was an unconstitutional use of the executive
branch's clemency power. 1 4 3 The Court's holding was an
empty victory, however, for McAuliffe's opponents. Mere
months after the Court's decision, McAuliffe-amidst severe
backlash from Virginia republicans-successfully implemented
an alternative re-enfranchisement process that individually restored the thousands of Virginia felons. 14 4 McAuliffe described
his office's aggressive restoration of felon voting rights as "an
issue of basic justice," stating:
I personally believe in the power of second chances in the
dignity and worth of a single human being .... These [disenfranchised felons] are gainfully employed. They send their
children and their grandchildren to our schools. They shop
at our grocery stores and they pay taxes. And I am not content to condemn them for eternity as inferior, second-class
citizens. 14 5

140
Norman Leahy & Paul Goldman, Let's Take Race Out of the Felon Voting
Rights Issue, WASH. POST (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2016/05/17/lets-take-race-out-of-the-felonvoting-rights-issue/?utmterm=.c6a2dadl499b [https://perma.cc/4A2J-WDK8].
141
See Pringle, supra note 134, at 62; see also Verified Petitionfor Writs of
Mandanus and Prohibitionand Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (May 23, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ffiles/analysis/Howell%20v0/2OMcAuliffe%20-%2OPetition.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/LJ2P-J6D4].
142
Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016).
143
See Pringle, supra note 134, at 64-65.
144
Laura Vozzella, Virginia's McAuliffe to Announce Restoration of Voting
Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginias-mcauliffe-to-announce-restorationof-voting-rights-to-13000-felons/2016/08/20/590b43ee-6652-11 e6-96c0-37
533479f3f5_story.html?utmterm=.febc6a248f28
[https://perma.cc/KH889XGC].
145
Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Restores Voting Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH.
POST (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/
mcauliffe-restores-voting-rights-to- 13000-felons/2016/08/22/2372bb72-6878-
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This process undoubtedly mitigated some of the racial effects of
4 6
Forty-five
Virginia's felon disenfranchisement policies.1
African
were
orders
McAuliffe's
by
percent of those affected
4 7 Certainly, McAuliffe's acts to halt felon disenAmerican.1
franchisement was effective. And for that, McAuliffe and all
other executive actors following in his footsteps are admirable.
Truly, this Note does not mean to critique their intentions or
detract in any way from the importance of their work. However,
the remainder of this section contends that-while McAuliffe
ultimately realized his goal of broadly restoring felon rightshis executive action came at substantial cost to the political
and social legitimacy of Virginia's governorship, as well as to
the working relationship between the state's executive and legislative branches.
Lessons from the McAuliffe Executive Order

B.
1.

PoliticalEfficacy

This section applies principles of political efficacy and consent theory to the events surrounding McAuliffe's executive
order to demonstrate that the executive order came at significant cost to McAuliffe's political legitimacy. Firstly, this section
engages with a brief discussion of political efficacy and consent
theory as they relate to this Note's argument. Then, this Note
will move to applying it to McAuliffe's executive order.
There has been extensive research and commentary on the
relationship between the public conception of government legitimacy and executive branch actions on both state and federal levels. Legitimacy, in the context of political science, is the
public's belief that an institution has a founded right to govern
society at large.' 4 3 Such trust "produces distinctive collective
11e6-99bf-fOcf3a6449a6_story.html?utm

term=.a57f7736cf6d [https://perma

.cc/7C2N-BQNU].

146

Norman Leahy & Paul Goldman, It's McAuliffe's Choice on IndividualRights

Restoration, WASH. PosT (Aug. 31,

2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2016/08/31 /its-mcauliffes-choice-on-individ
ual-rights-restoration/?utmterm=.9d2dda6716cc
78PX1.

[https://perma.cc/GA7Z-

Stolberg & Eckholm, supra note 135.
See Ian Hurd, Legitimacy, ENCYCLOPEDIA PRINCETONIESIS (2007) https://
pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/255 [https://perma.cc/W9NR-YKZT]; Fabienne Pe147

148

ter, Political Legitimacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017) https://

plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/PM2A-PA32] ("According to [Max] Weber, that a political regime is legitimate means its participants

In contrast to Weber's descriptive concept, the
have certain beliefs or faith . . .
normative concept of political legitimacy refers to some ... justification of political
power or authority . . . .")
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effects in society, including making collective social order more
efficient, more consensual, and perhaps more just."1 4 9 The
broad concept of this "trust" reappears in academic consent
theory, which follows the basic premise that the legitimization
of political authority necessitates the consent of the

governed.

150

Inquiry into a government's legitimacy and whether such
government has the consent of its citizens fundamentally engages with the tide of public opinion. James Stinson advances
the thesis that while static public opinion does not usually have
great power over government, a change in public opinion critically affects government and its actors. 1 5 1 Moreover, such
changes do not require large numbers of the public to engage
politically; he writes, "Great movements to left or right, to Democrat or Republican, or to approval or disapproval are produced
by the systematic change of a quite small number of people." 15 2
Public opinion surrounding executive action fluctuates based
on two principals, according to Eileen Braman. 15 3 That is to
say, individuals determining the legitimacy of an executive action rely on two factors-one objective and one subjective.
Firstly, citizens consider whether an executive action objectively complies with the U.S. Constitution or with procedure.
Secondly, citizens consider their prior subjective satisfaction
with the executive actor at hand. Braman concludes that:
149 See Hurd, supra note 148.
150 See Peter, supra note 148 (discussing consent as one potential source of
political legitimacy).
151

See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: How PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERI-

CAN POLrcs 158 (2004).
152 Id. at 158-59. This is not to say that public opinion is necessarily the
ultimate arbiter of an executive action's legitimacy. Many times, federal executive

action has been used to merely bring media attention to subjects outside of the
legislature's focus.

SUSAN PRICE, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE OR-

DERS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS (2005) https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005R-0579.htm [https://perma.cc/4BDZ-A4ED]. And in some cases, executive ac-

tion that at first is challenged by public outrage is later lauded for its effects. For
instance, President Grover Cleveland's decision to preserve forest reserves in Colorado was initially castigated as federal overreach. His action was denounced as
"arbitrary" and a "menace to the interests of the Western States." John D. Leshy,
Shaping the Modem West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72 U. COLO. L. REV.
287, 289 (2001). Yet later, much scholarship contends that "[w]ithout ...
bold

executive actions, the federal lands would probably be much diminished in both
size and quality today." Id. at 291.

153 Eileen Braman, Exploring Citizen Assessments of Unilateral Executive Authority, 50 L. & Soc. REv. 189, 220 (2016). While Braman's research sits within a

federal context-the executive officer at hand in the study was President Barack
Obama-it is not unreasonable for this Note to apply the same concepts to the
state level, as both occupy similar positions (albeit on different scales) as executive branch leaders.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1708

[Vol. 104:1679

[Wihile individuals may be willing to extend latitude to presidents they like and/or legislative actions they agree with in
judging the appropriateness of government deeds, that latitude is not unlimited. It is bound by conceptions of appropriate behavior across the different branches of government.
Clearly, citizens pay very close attention to whether government actors are following prescribed rules in evaluating the
legitimacy of state action. 154

A baseline understanding of political efficacy and consent theory gives this Note context within which to understand how
McAuliffe's executive order affected his office's legitimacy. The
crux of this section's argument is that McAuliffe's executive
order damaged the legitimacy and credibility of his governorship by swaying public opinion beyond the "appropriate" lati155
tude, to use Braman's terminology.
Following Howell v. McAuliffe, 15 6 polls from the Washington Post reflect division over what the Virginia public believed
1 57
were McAuliffe's motivations for issuing the executive order.
Forty-five percent of the state believed that McAuliffe was motivated out of his own altruism, while forty-two percent of the
state believed that McAuliffe was motivated because he wanted
to help Democrats with elections. 1 5 8 There is significant dissonance between these two motivations and Braman's factors.
That is to say, Virginians believed that McAuliffe was acting
based on his administration's interests-not the objective factor of procedure or constitutionality. In Braman's model, this
cuts against a finding of legitimacy.
Consider next Braman's second factor, subjective prior
satisfaction. The findings of the Washington Post were highly
partisan. Over seven in ten Republicans stated that McAuliffe
wanted to boost his party's voting pool while, similarly, over
1 5 9 At best, this
seven in ten Democrats stated the opposite.
factor appears neutral. However, this assumes that governorship baseline satisfaction levels run along party lines. In actuality, McAuliffe's approval ratings were not only weaker, but far
154 Id. at 219-20.
155
Id. at 189-92.
156
788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016).
See Laura Vozzella et al., Majority of VirginiansApprove of Terry McAulffe,
157
But Less So Than His Predecessors, WASH. PosT (Aug. 20, 2016) https://www

.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politis/gov-terry-mauliffe-is-less-popularmore-polarizing-than-recent-va-governors/2016/08/19/67c7af7a-6581-1 1e6be4e-23fc4d4dl2b4 story.html?utmterm=.170b82dc740f [https://perma.cc/
72UT-N49C].
158
159

Id.
Id.
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more partisan, than Virtually all of Virginia's past governors
over the past two decades. 1 6 0 For McAuliffe to buck Virginia's
established approval trends suggests that-like Stinson discusses-the tide of public opinion stemming from the drama of
his executive order has had an effect on McAuliffe's individual
legitimacy before the Virginian public.
In light of McAuliffe's potential presidential bid in 2020,
further research may want to consider whether Howell v. McAuliffe affects the way in which his campaign engages with partisan lines across the states.1 6 1 McAuliffe's approval among
registered voters was seventy-seven percent for Democrats,
fifty-three for independents, and twenty-seven percent for
Republicans. The fifty-point spread between the Democrats
and Republicans is larger than the gaps for the previous four
governors.1 6 2 The Washington Post notes that "[only [thenPresident] Qbama has ratings that are more polarized along
partisan lines than McAuliffe's."16 3 Julian Zelizer, a professor
of history and public affairs at Princeton University, hypothesizes that "there is too much Clinton" in McAuliffe for a successful presidential bid and argues that "he doesn't have the
kind of fire power on the campaign trail people will need to
really rally the base."1 6 4 On the other hand, however, perhaps
McAuliffe's executive action will benefit his ability to engage
with progressives outside of the establishment.16 5 Jennifer
Duffy of the Cook Political Report notes, "In 2016, [the Democratic Party] nominated a well-known, establishment candidate
and that didn't go so well .... My guess is they sort of make a
160
Id. Fifty-three percent of voters approve of McAuliffe, according to a new
Washington Post poll, and thirty-three percent disapprove. Id.
161
McAuliffe's intent to run for the presidency in 2020 "is widely assumed
around Richmond" and he has since been traveling around the country in an
effort to bolster the Democratic Party's status and assist in his fellow party members' elections. Gregory Schneider, McAuliffe May Be on His Way Out in Va., But
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180 in 2020, and the establishment Democrats may struggle.
And I think that given McAuliffe's long past in Democratic politics he'd probably fall into that category." 1 6 6
In sum, an examination of public opinion following the
McAuliffe executive action through the lens of Braman's twofactor test indicates that the public saw its issuance as a partisan act, rather than a legal one. Because of this, it ultimately
hurt the legitimacy of McAuliffe's administration as it gave the
impression that his administration's agenda was to roll out
personal policy agendas, rather than a more neutral, legitimate
goal.
2.

Bipartisanshipand Separationof Powers

Consider the concepts of bipartisanship and separation of
powers-both of which are fundamental to both state and federal government. True, founding father James Madison envisioned the two as distinct and at times at odds: A Madisonian
conception of the separation of powers relies on an "invisiblehand dynamic" to robustly constrain each branch's and each
party's powers. 16 7 Over time, however, American political
trends have moved away from the Madisonian ideal towards a
more cooperative vision based on the concepts of party dominance and allegiance. 1 6 8 This sort of cooperation has become a
necessary part of American governance; in many instances,
there must be cooperation between parties to some extent in
order for legislation to pass. Scholarship has found that bipartisanship is key to legislative effectiveness, albeit conditionally.1 6 9 Volden and Wiseman's Bipartisan Index model, which
tracks legislative cosponsorship activities as a way to understand the nature of bipartisanship, found that minority party
members receive more benefit from bipartisanship activities
than majority party members as "the former require the support of the [opposing] party for their bills to survive the commit70
tee process and pass the House."
In applying these concepts to McAuliffe's executive order,
this Note contends that McAuliffe's actions constructed an en166
167
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Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2317 (2006).
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169 See, e.g., Craig Volden & Alan E. Wiseman, Are BipartisanLawmakers
More Effective? (Ctr. for the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper: 4-2016,
2016), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_4_2016_final.pdf [https:/
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vironment in which cooperation between Virginia's Democratic
executive branch and Republican legislative branch was no
longer viable. The hostility between the two branches impeded
the ability of McAuliffe's office to push forward its individual
agenda, resulting in a heavy reliance on the governor's executive order power.17 1 As the Washington Post noted, "With 17
months left in office, McAuliffe enter[ed] the home stretch of his
four-year term with big goals in health care, economic development and felon-rights restoration still uncertain or unmet."l 7 2
Republicans, led by the plaintiffs of Howell, "blocked most of
the governor's legislative priorities, including expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act," leading McAuliffe to turn
"to executive order to get around the legislature."17 3 The
Weekly Standardreported, "Over the past four years, McAuliffe
accomplished little as governor. He was stymied by the house
of delegates, which is controlled by Republicans and led by
McAuliffe's nemesis, speaker William Howell."1 7 4 Moreover,
Volden and Wiseman's model indicates that the hostility was
more dangerous for the Democratic minority party rather than
the Republican majority. 5 Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder whether McAuliffe's agendas would have had more traction
without the effects of the executive order.
Furthermore, McAuliffe's executive order hurt the felon
disenfranchisement reform by polarizing re-enfranchisement
and aligning the movement with voter gamesmanship for the
2016 election. McAuliffe's Republican critics spilled much ink
criticizing the executive order as a ploy to boost votes for thencandidate Hillary Clinton. This perception-accurate or notrefocused felon disenfranchisement reform as a partisan issue
dealing more with voter fraud and ballot counting, rather than
civic rights and racial justice
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Resolution of Systematic Marginalization

McAuliffe's executive order at first glance did address the
marginalization of Virginia's black population. Additionally,
the adage "all news is good news" has its place within the
American body politic. 17 6 And certainly, McAuliffe's executive
order did attract the national spotlight to felon disenfranchisement as a policy concern. Moreover, McAuliffe's executive order also re-enfranchised a substantial number of felons.
However, this Note contends McAuliffe's executive order failed
to affect the systematic marginalization as created by Virginia's
felon disenfranchisement policies. Virginia, as discussed in
Part II.A of this Note, has a lifetime ban for felons. Felons in
Virginia, once their sentences are completed, are still subjected
to disenfranchisement until they may receive pardon; assuming they apply for such. 1 7 7 This means that the state's treatment of felon disenfranchisement is subject to reversal with the
change of power. True, the current Governor, Democrat Ralph
Northam 7 8 intends to continue issuing restorations through
his term.17 9 However, the Virginia Democratic party's efforts to
support Virginia felon disenfranchisement reform will likely
halt if and when a Republican governor is elected to office.
Moreover, executive action "can be invalidated by the courts or
undone by legislation,"s 0 as occurred in Howell v. McAuliffe.1 8 1
Felon disenfranchisement requires a more permanent solution.
One possible solution may come from state legislative reform. An example of state legislative reform is Senate Bill 340/
House Bill 980 in Maryland.1 8 2 In the spring of 2016, the legislature of Maryland restored voting rights to 40,000 citizens in
See PRICE, supra note 152.
See Newkirk II, supra note 22.
178
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182
Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
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the process of completing their probation or parole periods1 8 3
via SB 340. The legislative bill replaced previous Maryland law
that disenfranchised felons until they completed their entire
sentences, regardless of their status of incarceration. 18 4 Longevity is not the only benefit promised by legislative felon disenfranchisement reform. Consider the transparency that the
legislative procedure would bring to felon disenfranchise reform; this may address the first Braman factor as discussed in
Part II.A of this Note, where citizens consider whether an executive action objectively complies with the Constitution or with
procedure. 1 a5 The layered, procedural elements inherent in
legislation-the voting of citizens for their representatives and
the subsequent voting of legislators for amending disenfranchisement provisions-lends legislation legitimacy under
the first Braman factor. The second Braman factor, discussed
in Part II.A, also cuts more in favor of legislation compared to
gubernatorial action, as the bipartisan nature of legislative
branches makes members of Congress less likely to face the
same concentrated backlash that governors would receive.
Certainly, there would be concerns over the toxification of bipartisanship in the state assembly. However, the effect would
be more diffused.
With that being said, this Note contends in Part IV that
federal legislation-contrasted with state legislation-is the
most efficient and most consistent means of reform given its
nationwide effect.
IV
THE CASE FOR REFORM VIA FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A more appropriate means to enact broad felon disenfranchisement reform lies in the hands of the federal government: specifically, the legislative branch. This Note briefly
argues for the passage of the Democracy Restoration Act (DRA).
The DRA was first introduced to Congress in 2008 by Democratic Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, with the cosponsorship of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and Ben
Cardin of Maryland.1 8 6 The bill as introduced to the House of
Representatives declared that
The right of an individual who is a citizen of the United States
to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be denied or
183
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abridged because that individual has been convicted of a
criminal offense unless such individual is serving a felony
sentence in a correctional institution or facility at the time of
the election.1 8 7

Hence, the Democracy Restoration Act (DRA) would make it
such that no state could disenfranchise ex-felons, whether they
completed their entire sentence or were on parole or probation.
Moreover, the Democracy Restoration Act requires that exfelons be notified regarding their right to vote once leaving
prison, sentenced to probation, or convicted of a misdemeanor.
Since the DRA's introduction a decade ago, it has failed to
pass. In 2011, 2014, 2016, and 2018 the DRA has been reintroduced for Congress' appraisal. The most recent iteration
of the bill was introduced in the Second Session of the 115th
Congress by Congressman Jerrold Nadler of New York.18 8 This
Note contends that the legislature should seriously consider
the passage of the Democracy Restoration Act as a response to
the significant increase in felon disenfranchisement reform
among the states. This Part begins by enunciating the constitutionality of the DRA and then moves into exploring the practical benefits of the DRA as a tool for felon disenfranchisement
reform.
A.

A Legislative Solution is Constitutional

Currently, the federal government has no laws governing
felon voting rights. And certainly, the Constitution allocates
substantial governance over election to the individual states.
Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly gives the states the power
to oversee federal elections. Section 4 of Article 1-also known
as the Election Clause-reads:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of
chusing [sic] Senators.' 8 9

Article 1, however, also gives Congress the power to legislate to
protect the right to vote, and scholars have contended that
Section 4 of Article 1 extends Congress the power to enact felon

188
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9 0 For example, in Oregon v. Mitchell,191
re-enfranchisement.o
the Supreme Court upheld the legislature's ability to lower the
voting age in federal elections.1 9 2 Moreover, the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution' 9 3 grants Congress the power to
pass legislation superseding state constitutional provisions,
such as those that codify felon disenfranchisement law. Felon
disenfranchisement reform thus would be a congressional exercise of its Article 1 powers.
Scholars also contend that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments extend congressional authority to permit nonincarcerated ex-felons to vote in federal elections. 19 4 Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment allow Congress enforcement power via "ap6
propriate legislation."19 5 This power is "broad."1 9 Within the
context of racial reparations, legislative bills re-enfranchising
felons may be able to use the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-

ment as well as Hunter'9
B.

7

to secure constitutionality.

A Legislative Solution is Effective

There are considerable benefits that accompany a federal
legislative solution to felon disenfranchisement, as this Note
contends. This Note's prior discussion of state disenfranchisement policies has illustrated that there are significant discrepancies among the states regarding felon voting rights. The
diversity in state disenfranchisement polices has caused significant confusion over which citizens are eligible to vote, and
where.
190 See, e.g., Daniel M. Katz, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Voting
Rights Act, and Restoration of the CongressionalPortionof the Election Ballot: The
Final Frontierof Felon DisenfranchisernentJurisprudence?, 10 U. PA. J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE 47 (2007).
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
191
192 Id. at 121, 124.
193 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and

all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
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Moreover, it has given rise to situations in which an individual has a right to vote in a state without felon disenfranchisement but does not receive that same right in an
adjacent state that does maintain felon disenfranchisement.
On a sociological level, this scenario presents a problematic
value judgment in the latter state that does not exist in the
former, thus contributing to national felon stigmatization. It
would also negatively affect the second state's accountability
levels in comparison to the first, as the second state could vote
on and pass laws that affect ex-felon individuals-despite ensuring that ex-felons had no say or engagement with the
process.
This hypothetical illustrates some of the ways in which
states who disenfranchise felons fail to meet basic equity and
fairness conceptions built into the ideals of statehood and governance. A federal solution would provide a comprehensive
scheme for electoral officials in federal elections, thus creating
more equity and public accountability within the states. Moreover, it would deliver a comprehensive end to felon disenfranchisement's racialized effects by halting the process
entirely, even in states that are slower to achieve reform, truly
eradicating Jim Crow laws once and for all.
A federal solution would also eliminate substantive issues
with application of state disenfranchisement law. Research
from the ACLU indicates that state election officials do not
understand their own voter eligibility laws, or how to treat voters with previous convictions, 19 8 and suggests that there is
pervasive ignorance over how eligibility affects individuals on
probation or parole, whether misdemeanor crimes can disqualify voters, and how to re-register previously-disenfranchised
individuals. 9 9 Lee Rowland and Myrna Perez describe the "administrative confusion" surrounding felon disenfranchisement
policy:
Every individual with a past conviction is allowed to vote in
Maine and Vermont, while one in Kentucky or Virginia faces
permanent disenfranchisement unless he or she is granted
discretionary clemency. The vast majority of states fall somewhere in between these two extremes, leading to complex
eligibility requirements that often bewilder local election officials and create misconceptions among people with prior
198
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criminal records about their own eligibility. It is an inequity
to which we cannot subject citizens any longer. 2 0 0

A federal standard would greatly address the ambiguity of voting laws by replacing the current patchwork of felon disenfranchisement laws with a bright-line standard. Moreover, the
provision of the DRA mandating voting-rights education for
convicted persons and released persons would address
problems surrounding information inequity.
Why then, does the DRA continue to stall? The lack of
support, for the DRA boils down to partisan lines; indeed, the
entirety of the support for the House and Senate versions of the
bill is Democratic. 2 0 1 Many Republican statesmen contend
that the DRA is a.veiled attempt by Democrats to unfairly acquire votes. 2 0 2 Certainly, the population of incarcerated, as
discussed earlier in this Note, skews strongly minority and is
thus more likely to vote Democratic. 2 0 3 However, there are
significant concessions within the DRA that should quell conservative concerns. Firstly, the DRA does not affect state elections, thus addressing federalism concerns. Moreover, the
DRA only applies to ex-felons; felons who are still serving their
sentences are excluded from enfranchisement. Beyond that,
one can only surmise that partisanship-much like that of Virginia's legislature following McAuliffe's executive order-motivates part of the legislative animus against the bill.
CONCLUSION

This Note contends that there is a critical need for broad
felon disenfranchisement reform across the United States and
that the American public is more than willing to adopt such
reform. This reform ought to take place via federal legislation
rather than gubernatorial action, as has been the national
trend. While former Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe laudably
attempted to use his executive order powers to achieve blanket
disenfranchisement, his actions came at significant costs to
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Virginia's political efficacy and bipartisanship, and they did not
resolve the systematic racism inherent in felon disenfranchisement. A better solution would be the passage of the federal
Democracy Restoration Act. Looking forward, this Note contemplates the future of felon disenfranchisement reform upon
the national stage. Given the nation's willingness to achieve
reform-for example, Florida's November 2018 passage of major felon re-enfranchisement via constitutional amendmentthe author anticipates that broad reform is upon the horizon
and with it the final death rattle of Jim Crow.

